Can Suicide be a Compensable Work Injury?

The Vermont Department of Labor began 2025 by issuing two decisions addressing whether a claimant’s suicide can be considered a compensable work injury. These cases are The Estate of St. Germain v. Rutland Northeast Supervisory Union, Op. No. 01-25WC (Jan. 26, 2025), and The Estate of Weinheimer v. Turtle Fur Co. and Stockli, Op. No. 02-25WC (Feb. 4, 2025). Both decisions arose in the context of summary judgment motions, so they may not indicate whether the claimants will ultimately prevail. However, they illustrate the legal issues that arise in such claims.

The backdrop to any suicide claim is the standard of proof applicable to “mental-mental” claims. These are cases that arise entirely from psychological stressors, without any associated physical injury. The standard of proof for mental-mental claims is heightened. To succeed, the claimant must show that the psychological injury was caused by stressors that were extraordinary and unusual compared to those faced by the average employee across all occupations, and that the work-related stressors were the predominant cause of the psychological injury. See 21 V.S.A. § 201(11)(J)(i).

  Neither St. Germain nor Weinheimer directly address this heightened standard. Instead, they focus on ancillary legal issues. In St. Germain, the decedent was the subject of a sexual harassment complaint. The Supervisory Union investigated the matter and ultimately asked the decedent to resign voluntarily, or it would recommend that his contract not be renewed. The decedent, who had a history of childhood trauma, later died by suicide. His estate alleged that the combination of his past trauma, the stress of the harassment allegations, and the employer’s response led to his death.

The Supervisory Union sought dismissal on two grounds. First, it argued that 21 V.S.A. § 649 barred recovery because it prohibits compensation for injuries resulting from a claimant’s “willful intention to injure himself, herself, or another.” In response, the Commissioner adopted the majority view: if a suicide flows naturally from a work injury—including a mental injury—it is compensable. The intentional nature of the act does not, by itself, bar recovery.

Second, the Supervisory Union argued that the claim was barred under 21 V.S.A. § 201(11)(J)(ii), which excludes recovery for psychological injuries arising from “any disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, layoff, demotion, termination, or similar action taken in good faith by the employer.” While there was evidence that the decedent had been investigated and disciplined prior to his suicide, it was not strong enough to establish that this was the sole cause of death without a hearing. As a result, the Supervisory Union's motion for summary judgment was denied.

The central issue in Weinheimer was whether a concurrent employer could be held jointly responsible for a psychological injury. After three years of discovery, Defendant One presented no evidence that any stressor experienced while working for Defendant Two contributed to the decedent’s psychological condition. Accordingly, the case against Defendant Two was dismissed.